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NOTES
ADMIRALTY-DIVIDED DAMAGES RULE
REPLACED BY PROPORTIONATE FAULT IN
MARITIME COLLISION OR STRANDING CASES
In United States v. Reliable Transfer Co.,' the Supreme Court of the
United States was presented with the issue of the continued validity of the
rule of equally divided damages in admiralty.2 The Court rejected the rule
and adopted a proportional fault rule for property damage in maritime
collision or stranding cases. 3 It was held that when two or more parties have
contributed by their fault to cause a maritime collision or stranding, liability for damage resulting therefrom shall be allocated proportionately to the
comparative degree of fault of each party, except in cases where it is not
possible to fairly measure the comparative degrees of fault or where each
party was equally at fault, wherein liability is to be allocated equally.'
Respondent, Reliable Transfer Company, was the owner of a coastal
tanker, the MARY A. WHALEN. The WHALEN was involved in a stranding accident when it ran aground on a sandbar in an attempt to avoid
collision with a breakwater. The breakwater was ordinarily marked with a
flashing light maintained by the Coast Guard; however, on the night of the
stranding, the light was inoperative.
Reliable Transfer brought suit against the United States in federal district court' under the Suits in Admiralty Act 6 and the Federal Tort Claims
Act,7 seeking to recover damages caused by the stranding. The district
court found that the grounding was caused 75% by the WHALEN and 25%
by the failure of the Coast Guard to maintain the breakwater light;" however, applying the then well-settled admiralty rule of divided damages, the
court held that each party was liable for one-half of the damages.9 Upon
appeal taken by the United States, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit affirmed, adhering to the rule. 0
1.
__
U.S.-, 95 S.Ct. 1708, 44 L.Ed.2d 251 (1975).
2. The rule, simply stated, is that in the event of a collision at sea where two or more
parties are at fault, the total sum of the damages shall be divided equally among the parties
without regard to the proportionate degree of fault of either party. Id. at __,
95 S.Ct. at
1709, 44 L.Ed.2d at 254.
3. Id. at __, 95 S.Ct. at 1715, 44 L.Ed.2d at 262.
4. Id. at __, 95 S.Ct. at 1715-16, 44 L.Ed.2d at 262.
5. This case was brought in the District Court for the Eastern District of New York;
however, the opinion of the court is unreported.
6. 46 U.S.C.A. §741 et seq. (Rev. 1975).
7. 28 U.S.C.A. §1346 et seq. (Supp. 1975).
8. __
U.S. at __,
95 S.Ct. at 1710, 44 L.Ed.2d at 255.
9. Id. at
, 95 S.Ct. at 1710, 44 L.Ed.2d at 255.
10. United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 497 F.2d 1036 (2d Cir. 1974).
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The Government petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari on the sole
issue of whether the admiralty rule of divided damages should be replaced
by a rule of damages in proportion to fault." The Court held in the affirmative and vacated the judgment of the district court, remanding for further
proceedings consistent with the opinion.'
The rule of divided damages stems from the ancient "moiety rule" and
dates back to the 12th century Laws of Oleron. Because the Laws of Oleron
were known to England and recognized as authority during the 14th century, one presumes that the rule was applied by English admiralty courts
during that period. However, the character of the moiety rule as it developed was not founded on a basis of negligence, but rather on the basis of
mere "risk sharing," whereby parties involved in collisions shared the cost
of the damage regardless of fault. As English common law evolved and
concepts of negligence and fault arose, the courts were at a loss in the
application of the ancient rule when negligence was proved against one or
both ships."
This conflict was finally settled in 1815 when Lord Stowell delivered his
now famous dictum in The WOODROP-SIMS, 14 wherein he declared the
divided damages rule to be controlling law and applicable only in cases
where both vessels were at fault. Thus the controversy over the risk-sharing
basis of the ancient moiety rule and the fault concepts of modern law was
resolved.1 5 Lord Stowell's decree was given added strength when cited by
the House of Lords in Hay v. Le Neve 6 in overruling a Scottish decision
which had apportioned damages unequally in a maritime collision case.
The rule of divided damages as it is known today became firmly entrenched in English law by 1824.
In the United States during the colonial period and early post-Revolution days, there was much confusion as to the applicability of the rule."
8
It was not until 1854 in The Schooner CA THARINE v. Dickinson"
that
the United States Supreme Court was first squarely presented with the
question of accepting or rejecting the rule in cases of mutual fault in
collisions at sea. In this suit over the damages resulting from a collision
between two schooners, the Court determined that both parties had been
11. United States v. Reliable Transfer Co.,
- U.S. -, 95 S.Ct. 491, 42 L.Ed.2d 291
(1974), cert. granted.
12.
- U.S. at __,
95 S.Ct. at 1716, 44 L.Ed.2d at 262 (1975).
13. See Staring, Contributionand Division of Damages in Admiralty and Maritime Cases,
45 CALIF. L. REV. 304, 305-08 (1957).
14. 2 Dods. 83, 165 Eng. Rep. 1422 (Adm. 1815).
15. For a detailed history of the origins of the divided damages rule, see Staring, supra
note 13 and Huger, The ProportionalDamage Rule in Collisions at Sea, 13 CORN. L. Q. 531
(1928).
16. 2 Shaw Scotch App. 395 (1824).
17. See Staring, supra note 13.
18. 58 U.S. (17 How.) 170, 15 L.Ed. 233 (1854).
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negligent."' A problem remained as to the manner in which damages were
to be allocated.
The rule that prevails in the district and circuit courts, we understand,
has been to divide the loss. [Citation omitted.]
This seems now to be the well-settled rule in English admiralty.
[Citations omitted.]
Under circumstances usually attending these disasters, we think the
rule dividing the loss the most just and equitable, and best tending to
induce care and vigilance on both sides, in the navigation."
The Schooner CATHARINE decision, adopting the divided damages rule,
has been firmly adhered to by the American courts for over 120 years.2"
As to the practice of other nations regarding liability for damage resulting from maritime collisions, the Brussels Collision Liability Convention
of 191022 produced a uniform rule to which most of the world adheres."1 In
the Convention, the rule of divided damages was rejected and replaced by
a proportional damages, or comparative negligence, rule. The proportional
damage rule states that liability for damage shall be determined in proportion to the comparative degrees of fault in cases of collision at sea resulting
from mutual negligence by more than one party. Until Reliable Transfer,
America was the only major maritime nation which did not subscribe to a
proportional damage rule with regard to maritime collisions.
The divided damages rule has great potential for producing harsh results. A strict application of the rule can result in a party having to bear
one-half of the liability for damage, where their relatively minor negligence
19. Id. at 177, 15 L.Ed. at 235.
20. Id. at 177-78, 15 L.Ed. at 235.
21. The cases which reaffirmed The Schooner CATHARINE are far too numerous to
cite; however, a few chosen at random are: Union Oil Co. of California v. The SAN JACINTO, 409 U.S. 140, 93 S.Ct. 368, 34 L.Ed.2d 365 (1972); Weyerhauser S.S. Co. v. United
States, 372 U.S. 597, 83 S.Ct. 926, 10 L.Ed.2d 1 (1963); Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282, 72 S.Ct. 277, 96 L.Ed. 318 (1952); The CHATTAHOOCHEE, 173 U.S. 540, 19 S.Ct. 491, 43 L.Ed. 801 (1898); The NORTH STAR, 106 U.S. 17,
1 S.Ct. 41, 27 L.Ed. 91 (1882).
22. As translated in 6 A. KNAUTH, BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY 39 (7th ed. 1969), the pertinent
section of the Convention reads as follows:
ARTICLE 1.
Where a collision occurs between seagoing vessels and vessels of inland
navigation the compensation due for damages caused to the vessels, or to any things
or persons on board thereof, shall be settled in accordance with the following provisions, in whatever waters the collision takes place. ...
4. If two or more vessels are in fault the liability of each vessel shall be
in proportion to the degree of the faults respectively committed. Provided that if,
having regard to the circumstances, it is not possible to establish the degree of the
respective faults, or if it appears that the faults are equal, the liability shall be
apportioned equally.
23. For a list of the countries which have adopted the Convention see 6 A. KNAUTH,
BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY 38-39 (7th ed. 1969).
ARTICLE
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contributed in some slight manner to a collision. For example, in The
PENNSYLVANIA, 4 the Court applied the divided damages rule to a collision case where one ship's minor statutory violation had contributed only
slightly to the collision. In arriving at this decision, the Court announced
a new rule regarding maritime collisions involving statutory violations.
But when, as in this case, a ship at the time of a collision is in actual
violation of a statutory rule intended to prevent collisions, it is no more
than a reasonable presumption that the fault, if not the sole cause, was
at least a contributory cause of the disaster. In such a case, the burden
rests upon the ship of showing not merely that her fault might not have
been one of the causes, or that it probably was not, but that it could not
the stathave been. Such a rule is necessary to enforce obedience to .
ute.25
Therefore, the rule in The PENNSYLVANIA shifts the plaintiff's burden
of proof of causation to the defendant to show that no causal connection
could have existed-a burden nearly impossible to sustain. Thus the dangers of the divided damages rule are compounded. In the great majority of
cases, the rule in The PENNSYLVANIA has been strictly applied.26
The Supreme Court soon recognized the inequities of the divided damages rule and derived what is known as the "major-minor" fault doctrine. 7
This doctrine holds that where a collision results primarily from the negligence of one vessel, and there is great disparity of fault, the court may
excuse the fault of the minor offender.2 8 Thereby, the grossly negligent
vessel may be deemed to be solely at fault. The doctrine to some degree
has avoided the application of the divided damages rule, but it has not
entirely mitigated the harsh results so often found in mutual fault cases.
When the disparity in fault is not extreme and when the rule in The
PENNSYLVANIA is applied to establish fault, the "major-minor" fault
doctrine is apparently not applicable.2 Moreover, the doctrine has been
criticized for replacing one injustice with another. It is no less inequitable
that a more negligent vessel be required to shoulder all of the cost under
The PENNSYLVANIA, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 125, 22 L.Ed. 148 (1873).
Id. at 136, 22 L.Ed. at 131 (emphasis added).
See Jackson, The Archaic Rule of Dividing Damages in Marine Collisions, 19 ALA. L.
REV. 263, 268-69 (1967). For an in-depth discussion of cases which have applied the rule in
The PENNSYLVANIA, see 4 A. KNAUTH, BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY 263-67 (6th ed. 1949, Supp.
1972).
27. The "major-minor" fault doctrine finds its basis as far back as 1874 in The GREAT
REPUBLIC, 90 U.S. (Wall.) 20, 23 L.Ed. 55 (1874). However, the doctrine was clearly accepted by the Court in 1893 in The CITY OF NEW YORK, 147 U.S. 72, 13 S.Ct. 211, 37 L.Ed.
84 (1893). See also The VICTORY, 168 U.S. 410, 18 S.Ct. 149, 41 L.Ed. 519 (1897); The
UMBRIA, 166 U.S. 404, 17 S.Ct. 610, 41 L.Ed. 1053 (1897); The LUDVIG-HOLBERG, 157
U.S. 60, 157 S.Ct. 477, 39 L.Ed. 620 (1895); The OREGON, 158 U.S. 186, 15 S.Ct. 804, 39
L.Ed. 943 (1894).
28. The CITY OF NEW YORK, 147 U.S. 72, 85, 13 S.Ct. 211, 216, 37 L.Ed. 84 (1893).
29. See Jackson, supra note 26 at 270.
24.
25.
26.
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the "major-minor" fault doctrine than a less negligent vessel be required
to shoulder one-half of the damages under the rule in The
PENNS YL VANIA .o
In 1922 the rule of divided damages in collision cases was expanded by
the Supreme Court to non-collision situations which involve stranding or
grounding of vessels. In the case of White Oak TransportationCo. v. Boston, Cape Cod & N.Y. Canal Co.," a vessel was grounded as a result of
negligent navigation on the part of the ship's crew combined with the canal
company's misrepresentations concerning the depth of the water. The
Court held that the ship and the canal company were to divide their
respective damages.3" This firmly entrenched the application of the divided
damages rule to cases involving grounding or stranding.
America's adherence to the divided damages rule and the resulting injustices has been the subject of criticism for many years. 33 The lower federal courts have, for the most part, applied the rule grudgingly, harshly
criticizing it for its absurd and inequitable results, yet feeling incapable
of avoiding the rule until Congress or the Supreme Court sanctioned a
departure therefrom.3" It seems anomalous that Congress should adopt a
3
comparative negligence rule for determining damages in wrongful death
30. See Tank Barge HYGRADE, INC. v. The Tug GATCO NEW JERSEY, 250 F.2d 485
(3rd Cir. 1957). The rule has further been criticized as being inadequate and a "constant
temptation to courts to avoid a decision on the merits." National Bulk Carriers, Inc. v. United
States, 183 F.2d 405, 410 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 865 (1950) (dissenting opinion).
31. 258 U.S. 341, 42 S.Ct. 338, 66 L.Ed. 649 (1922). See also Atlee v. Northwestern Union
Packet Co., 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 389, 22 LEd. 619 (1874).
32. 258 U.S, at 343, 42 S.Ct. at 339, 66 L.Ed. at 653.
33. See G. GILMORE AND C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 528-31 (2d ed. 1975); Donovan
and Ray, Mutual Fault-HalfDamage Rule-A CriticalAnalysis, 41 INs. COUN. J. 395 (1974);
Allbritton, Division of Damages in Admiralty-A Rising Tide of Confusion, 2 J. MARITIME L.
& COMM. 322 (1971); Jackson, supra note 26; Staring, supra note 13; Mole and Wilson, A
Study of Comparative Negligence, 17 CORN. L. Q. 333 (1932); and Huger, supra note 15.
34. See Tank Barge HYGRADE, INC. v. The Tug GATCO NEW JERSEY, 250 F.2d 485
(3d Cir. 1957); Adams v. Construction Aggregates Corp., 237 F.2d 884 (2d Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 971 (1957); Marine Fuel Transfer Corp. v. The RUTH, 231 F.2d 319 (2d Cir.
1956).
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has been a great critic of the rule. As was
stated by the late Judge Learned Hand in his dissent in National Bulk Carriers, Inc. v. United
States, 183 F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S, 865 (1950):
An equal division in this case would be plainly unjust; they ought to be divided in
some such proportion as five to one. And so they could be but for our obstinate
cleaving to the ancient rule which has been abrogated by nearly all civilized nations. Indeed, the ["major-minor"] doctrine that a court should not look too jealously at the navigation of one vessel, when the faults of the other are glaring, is in
the nature of a sop to Cerberus. It is no doubt better than nothing; but it is
inadequate to reach the heart of the matter, and constitutes a constant temptation
to courts to avoid a decision on the merits. Nevertheless, so long as our antiquated
doctrine prevails, I think we should apply it unflinchingly, and in the case at bar I
would divide the damages.
183 F.2d at 410 (dissenting opinion).
35. See Death on The High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C.A. §761 et seq. (Rev. 1975).
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and personal injury cases" in maritime and yet not for collision or stranding damage. Despite a strong favorable contingency, 7 ratification of the
Brussels Collision Convention has failed. However, opposition to the Convention has not been attributed to the proportional damage rule as applied
to ship damage, but rather to the rule as applied to damage to cargo,
American
baggage, and property of the crew, in that it would eliminate the
3
rule of joint and several liability of vessels for cargo damage. 1
The Supreme Court, however, has had an opportunity to re-examine the
divided damages rule on several occasions in recent times. In Halcyon
Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp.,3 the Court, in considering
the expansion of the rule of divided damages t ,non-collision cases, reaffirmed the rule as applied to property damage in collision situations. However, the Court did not discuss the relative merits of the rule nor was the
Court presented with the question of its propriety in present-day application.
In Weyerhauser S.S. Co. v. United States, 40 the Court held that the
scope of the divided damages rule in mutual fault collisions remained
unaffected by the limited liability provisions of the Federal Employees'
Compensation Act, thus reaffirming the rule. Again, the Court did not
discuss the validity of the basis of the rule in its present application.
In the 1972 case, Union Oil Co. of California v. The SAN JACINTO,4
the Court was asked to reject the divided damages rule in maritime collision cases; however, the court circumvented the issue by concluding that
one of the vessels was not a contributing cause to the collision.42
Thus, in Reliable Transfer the Court finally found itself squarely facing
the issue of the continuing validity of the rule. In adopting the proportional
fault rule, the Court re-examined the underpinnings of the divided damages rule and appraised the propriety of applying it today. The Court found
that when the rule was first adopted in The Schooner CATHARINE, there
had existed valid reasons for its application.
The rule was adopted because it was then the prevailing rule in England,
because it had become the majority rule in the lower federal courts, and
because it seemed "most just and equitable, and .. .best' 3 [tended] to
induce care and vigilence on both sides, in the navigation."
36. See the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.A. §688 et seq. (Rev. 1975), which incorporates by reference the comparative negligence rule of the Federal Employer's Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A.
§51 et. seq. (Rev. 1972).
37. See 4 A. KNAUTH, BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY 262 (6th ed. 1949, Supp. 1972) and Jackson,
supra note 26 at 273.
38. See 4 A. KNAUTH, BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY, 262-69 (6th ed. 1949, Supp. 1972) and
Donovan, supra note 33.
39. 342 U.S. 282, 284, 72 S.Ct. 277, 279, 96 L.Ed. 318, 319-20 (1952).
40. 372 U.S. 597, 604, 83 S.Ct. 926, 930, 10 L.Ed.2d 1, 7 (1963).
41. 409 U.S. 140, 141, 93 S.Ct. 368, 370, 34 L.Ed.2d 365, 368 (1972).
42. Id. at 146, 93 S.Ct. at 372, 34 L.Ed.2d at 371.
95 S.Ct. at 1711, 44 L.Ed.2d at 257, quoting from The Schooner
43.
__
U.S. at -,
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However, the Court found that this underlying rationale no longer justified
the rule's continued existence. The Court noted that virtually all the
world's major maritime nations, including Great Britain, had adopted the
comparative negligence rule set out in the Brussels Convention. This left
the United States practically alone in its adherence to the divided damages
rule, resulting in the encouragement of transoceanic forum shopping."
Further, the Court found that the lower federal courts no longer reveled in
its application, but rather "they have more recently followed it only grudgingly, terming it 'unfair,' 'illogical,' 'arbitrary . . .archaic and frequently
unjust.' "' With these factors noted, the Court determined that the original adherence by the judiciary to the rule should no longer be considered
a valid reason for maintaining it.
The Court's most severe criticism of the rule was in terms of justice and
equity.
It is no longer apparent, if it ever was, that this solomonic division of
damages serves to achieve even rough justice. An equal division of damages is a reasonably satisfactory result only where each vessel's fault is
approximately equal and each vessel thus assumes a share of the collision
damages in proportion to its share of the blame, or where proportionate
degrees of fault cannot be measured and determined on a rational basis.
The rule produces palpably unfair results in every other case. "
The Court also noted that the greatest potential unfairness is exemplified by the application of the rule of The PENNSYLVANIA. 7 Furthermore, the Court's one escape-valve from the harshness of the rule-the
"major-minor" fault doctrine-simply displaces one inequity by another."
In response to the assertion that the rule of divided damages is justified
because it promotes out-of-court settlements and that comparative degrees
of negligence are difficult to determine, the Court pointed out that the
"major-minor" fault doctrine induces the less negligent party to litigate,
and that every other major maritime nation has been able to apply a rule
of comparative negligence without serious difficulties. 9 Also, when it is not
possible to determine comparative degrees of fault, then the damages may
50
be divided.
Overall, through a lengthy and extensive examination of the underlying
CATHARINE v. Dickinson, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 170, 177-78, 15 L.Ed. 233, 235 (1854).
44. Id. at -,
95 S.Ct. at 1712, 44 L.Ed. 2d at 258.
45. Id. at __,
95 S.Ct. at 1712, 44 L.Ed.2d at 258, quoting from Ahlgren v. Red Star
Towing & Transp. Co., 214 F.2d 618, 620 (2d Cir. 1954); Marine Fuel Transfer Corp. v. The
RUTH, 231 F.2d 319, 321 (2d Cir. 1956); and Tank Barge HYGRADE, INC. v. The GATCO
NEW JERSEY, 250 F.2d 485, 488 (3d Cir. 1957), respectively (footnotes omitted).
46.
47.
48.

U.S. at __, 95 S.Ct. at 1713, 44 L.Ed.2d at 259 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at __,
95 S.Ct. at 1713, 44 L.Ed.2d at 259.
Id. at __, 95 S.Ct. at 1713, 44 L.Ed.2d at 259.

49.
50.

Id. at
Id. at

-,

__,

95 S.Ct. at 1714, 44 L.Ed.2d at 260.
95 S.Ct. at 1714, 44 L.Ed.2d at 260.
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rationale, both past and present, of the divided damages rule, the Court
concluded that its existence was no longer justified and that the judiciary
should shoulder the responsibility for fashioning a more equitable doctrine
in regard to maritime collision.
The rule of divided damages in admiralty has continued to prevail in
this country by sheer inertia rather than by reason of any intrinsic merit.
The reasons that originally led to the Court's adoption of the rule have
long since disappeared. . . . [W]orldwide experience has taught that
that goal [of a just and equitable allocation of damages] can be more
nearly realized by a standard that allocates liability for damages according to comparative fault whenever possible."
While it is true that the rule of divided damages in maritime has long
been subjected to severe criticism by both the judiciary and by legal scholars,5 2 neither the Supreme Court nor Congress had up until now seen fit to
sanction a change. The Court's opinion in Reliable Transfer, in light of
Congress' failure to act, is commendable. It is an excellent analysis of the
underpinnings of the rule; well-thought-out, completely realistic, and to
the point. The Court examined the rule within a contextual framework of
justice and equity. Using a paradigmatic approach and examining the
flaws in the relationship existing between factual situations and a long
established maritime law, the Court discarded one rule and replaced it
with another. Such pragmatism and intrinsic rationality should be applauded. The decision is a step in updating an antiquated rule that is no
longer justified and demonstrates the judicial role in shaping the course of
maritime and admiralty law in the United States.
As to the consequences of adopting a comparative negligence rule in
admiralty, one need only examine the effect in other jurisdictions; every
other major maritime nation has adopted the rule with fair results.5 3 More51. Id. at __
95 S.Ct. at 1715, 44 L.Ed.2d at 262.
52. See notes 33 and 34 supra and accompanying text.
53. Mole and Wilson point out the relative lack of problems that comparative negligence
has caused in other countries:
As to the imposition of too great a burden on our judges, the experience of other
countries applying the rule of proportionate damages shows strongly that no difficulty has been encountered on this point. The Maritime Conventions Act of 1911
[which incorporated the proportionate damage rule of the Brussels Convention of
19101 in England has provided . . . that where it is difficult or impossible to
allocate degrees of blame on both ships . . . the rule of division of loss would not
be altered, and that each wrongdoer should bear one-half of the total loss. But in
the majority of cases it is possible to find blame greater on one side than on the
other, and in such cases it is only fair that there should be an apportioning of the
loss. . ..
Mole and Wilson, supra note 33 at 349.
See also Huger, note 15 supra at 547-58 for a statistical study of the effect of an adaptation
of a comparative negligence rule.
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over, Congress has long sanctioned a comparative negligence rule for
wrongful death 4 and personal injury" cases in maritime. More difficulty
is foreseeable in the matter of proof and additional litigation of cases;
however, this consequence is certainly preferable to the inequities heretofore suffered as a result of the divided damages rule. As was stated by the
Court in Reliable Transfer, "[clongestion in the courts cannot justify a
legal rule that produced unjust results in litigation simply to encourage
speedy out-of-court accommodations.""8
MARGARET LESLIE COOPER
54.
55.
56.

The Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.A. §688 et seq. (Rev. 1975).
Death on The High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C.A. §766 et seq. (Rev. 1975).
U.S. at -, 95 S.Ct. at 1714, 44 L.Ed.2d at 261.

